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Modelling Deep Indeterminacy 
 





This paper constructs a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can accommodate a kind 
of ‘deep’ worldly indeterminacy that arguably arises in quantum mechanics via the Kochen-
Specker theorem, and that is incompatible with prominent theories of metaphysical 
indeterminacy such as that in Barnes and Williams (2011). We construct a variant of Barnes 
and Williams's theory that avoids this problem. Our version builds on situation semantics 
and uses incomplete, local situations rather than possible worlds to build a model. We 
evaluate the resulting theory and contrast it with similar alternatives, concluding that our 
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This paper presents a model of metaphysical indeterminacy. It attempts to provide a 
structure that captures the sort of ‘deep’ metaphysical indeterminacy which causes 
problems for a number of existing theories. Our core idea is this: metaphysical 
indeterminacy is a matter of reality being unsettled between parts which fundamentally 
disagree about how the world is.  
 
Providing models for metaphysical indeterminacy is a flourishing industry (see, e.g., Akiba 
2004; Barnes and Williams 2011; Wilson 2013; Torza 2017; Calosi and Wilson 2018). The 
motivation is to provide a systematic account of how metaphysical indeterminacy should be 
theorised. This is valuable because to investigate metaphysical indeterminacy and its 
applications thoroughly, we should first be clear about how to understand it. Even the 
sceptic about the existence or coherence of metaphysical indeterminacy should welcome 
such clarity. 
 
Several such theories of metaphysical indeterminacy (Akiba 2004; Barnes and Williams 
2011, for example) share a common feature - they presuppose that although reality is not 
precise, it could be. Metaphysical indeterminacy is then explained as unsettledness between 
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different precise candidates for how reality is. Quantum indeterminacy is especially 
interesting in this regard (Darby 2010; Skow 2010), because although it is one of the main 
naturalistic motivations for a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, the reason that it is a 
popular example of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy is that quantum reality simply 
cannot be precisified all at once - the Kochen-Specker theorem appears to show that 
assigning precise values to all observables is mathematically impossible (given non-
commutative algebras of observables). Thus the theories of metaphysical indeterminacy 
that require complete precisifications of reality are undermined. 
 
We present what we consider an obvious solution: to work with a view according to which 
precisifications are local rather than global. Kochen-Specker rules out assigning precise 
values to all observables, so a natural fix is for a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy to 
assign precise values to only some observables in this context. The move parallels the 
thought that although the metaphysics literature makes great use of possible worlds, which 
are essentially complete or maximal, there are many purposes, among which is this one, for 
which less-than-maximal possibilities are theoretically important. This idea can be cashed 
out in various ways, notably in situation semantics, which uses parts of possible worlds 
(situations) as the basis of meaning. Situations are thereby inherently partial (Kratzer 1989), 
and various theoretical advantages are claimed including accounts of anaphora (Elbourne 
2005), definite descriptions (Elbourne 2013) and the liar paradox (Barwise and Etchemendy 
1987).1  
 
Our approach will be to take incompatible situations as our candidate precisifications 
between which reality is unsettled. We explore how these devices are naturally given a 
metaphysical reading in the style of Barnes and Williams (2011). In doing so, we propose an 
account of metaphysical indeterminacy which neatly aligns with quantum mechanical 
motivations for understanding reality as unsettled.  
 
Our paper will be structured as follows: first we shall give some brief background on existing 
accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. We will then explain the distinctive challenge of 
‘deep’ indeterminacy (in the quantum case and in general). Our fourth section introduces 
our model in some detail. In our fifth section we evaluate the model, especially with respect 
to some nearby alternatives we have chosen not to pursue, before concluding. 
 
 
2. Meta-level accounts and the Barnes-Williams Model 
 
To present our alternative, we should first give a brief recap on the state of play.  
 
What is indeterminacy? One helpful way to think of it is as an irremovable sort of 
unsettledness. It has a number of different species. A paradigm understanding of 
indeterminacy is found in the vagueness literature in the philosophy of language: it is 
indeterminate whether some stones make a heap. This kind of indeterminacy is naturally 
thought of as representational: it is not ‘out there in the world’, rather there is just no fact 
of the matter about whether those stones fall under the meaning of the word ‘heap’. The 
                                                          
1 Situations are also used by Edginton (1985) in the context of Fitch’s Paradox and Rumfitt (2015 and 
elsewhere) in the context of logical consequence, to give further examples. 
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indeterminacy involved in these vagueness cases is therefore naturally interpreted as 
semantic. 
 
Metaphysical indeterminacy is indeterminacy of a different sort. The intuitive idea of 
metaphysical indeterminacy is that it is non-representational indeterminacy. This requires 
elaboration. The core notion is that metaphysical indeterminacy is indeterminacy that is 
really ‘out there in the world’. If semantic indeterminacy is a result of some sort of 
deficiency in language, and epistemic indeterminacy is a result of deficiency in knowers, 
metaphysical indeterminacy in a result of deficiency in how things are. Along these lines, 
Barnes (2010) takes metaphysical indeterminacy to be that indeterminacy that would 
remain even if the all the representational indeterminacy were removed - that is, if all other 
sources of deficiency were taken away. 
 
Saying what metaphysical indeterminacy is supposed to be is obviously also relevant to 
whether there is, or could be, any. This issue is contentious: it is by no means universally 
accepted that the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy is coherent. Nor is it universally 
accepted that metaphysical indeterminacy is possible. One indirect way to argue for the 
coherence and possibility of such indeterminacy is to construct explicit models of it; 
providing precise accounts of a purported phenomenon can make that phenomenon seem 
more respectable. Examples of models of metaphysical indeterminacy include Akiba (2004), 
Barnes and Williams (2011), Wilson (2013) and Torza (2017). Here we focus on a particular 
class of models which treat metaphysical indeterminacy in a way akin to linguistic 
indeterminacy. In a case of linguistic indeterminacy, language could be more precise, but is 
not. Indeterminacy arises when something is true on some precisifications of the language 
and false on others. In a parallel way, these models take it that the world itself could be 
more precise, but is not. Metaphysical indeterminacy then arises when something is true on 
some precisifications of the world and not on others. This class of models are called ‘meta-
level’ accounts by Wilson (contrasting with her own ‘object-level’ view).  
 
The main idea in Barnes and Williams (2011) (‘BW’) is that we should treat metaphysical 
indeterminacy in much the same way as the supervaluationist treats cases of vagueness: 
namely by considering different candidate precisifications and regarding something as 
indeterminate when the different precisifications disagree about that thing. To be more 
specific, BW propose a model whereby there are different candidate precisifications of 
actuality. These precisifications are ersatz possible worlds, and to be a candidate for 
representing actuality is to not determinately fail to represent actuality. So the ersatz worlds 
are representations of reality, and some group of them are distinctive by being those which 
do not determinately represent actuality inaccurately. These worlds, which are complete 
and precise, are the mechanism by which to express indeterminacy. It is determinate that p 
iff all of the ersatz worlds that are candidates for representing actuality are p-worlds, 
determinate that ¬p iff none of these worlds are p-worlds, and indeterminate whether p iff 
some but not all of these worlds are p-worlds. So, formally speaking, we evaluate 
propositions not at a specific (maximal, sharply defined) world, but rather evaluate them on 
sets of worlds. If there is no metaphysical indeterminacy, only one candidate will not 





(Because they use ‘not determinately failing to represent actuality’ as the condition for 
being a member of the set of precifications, the Barnes-Williams model is not reductive in 
an important sense. But our main focus here – the source of the trouble with deep 
indeterminacy and the reason for the move from worlds to situations – is on the structural 
features of the model rather than its reductive ambitions.) 
 
BW add to this structure the claim that “there is the One True actualized world - it is just 
indeterminate which world this is” (p.131). This can be a little hard to parse, but we 
understand it to mean that there really is exactly one ersatz world which correctly 
represents actuality, but it is indeterminate which one it is.  
 
A feature of the BW model is that it can uphold classical logic (BW point to this as a benefit). 
In particular, both bivalence and excluded middle are retained. They have bivalence because 
every possible world which is a candidate is bivalent: for any proposition p either p is true in 
a world or p is false in that world. Given that these are the candidates for actuality, and that 
one of them is in fact the One True world, bivalence holds. The theory retains the principle 
of excluded middle because for any proposition p, (p ∨ ¬p) is true at all worlds, so 
determinately true.  
 
On the BW approach, indeterminacy has an interesting parallel with modality. Something is 
necessary when true in all possible worlds and contingent when true in some but not all 
possible worlds. Similarly, on the BW model, something is determinate when true in all the 
possible worlds in a restricted range and indeterminate when true in some but not all of the 
possible worlds in that range. The relevant possible worlds are those which do not 
determinately fail to represent actuality. As a consequence, a disjunction might be 
determinate while its disjuncts are indeterminate, in the same way that a disjunction can be 
necessary while its disjuncts are contingent. For instance, ‘the university is in the city centre’ 
and ‘the university is in the suburbs’ may both be indeterminate while ‘the university is 
either in the city centre or in the suburbs’ is determinately true. 
 
The modal comparison will be significant later when we consider the needed modification 
to cope with deep indeterminacy - the modification is analogous to treatments of modal 
logic using less-than-maximal possibilities instead of the more familiar possible worlds. But 
first, we shall set out the issue arising for the BW model from deep indeterminacy. 
 
 
3. The Challenge of Deep Indeterminacy 
 
As has been mentioned above, quantum mechanics is often cited as an example of 
metaphysical indeterminacy, or indeed as a motivation for developing a theory of such 
indeterminacy. Many more recent interpretations of quantum mechanics, however, don’t 
obviously seem to generate a case for such indeterminacy.2 Nevertheless, and without going 
                                                          
2 For example, in the modern Everett interpretation the underlying ontology, from which the branches 
emerge, is perfectly determinate (whether the branches themselves are is another matter, but the underlying 
ontology is the level at which one would naturally judge the question of whether there is metaphysical 
indeterminacy). In the modern ‘flashy’ GRW theory, the distribution of flashes in spacetime is also perfectly 
determinate. If one subscribes to the view that, one way or another, what is fundamental is the wave function 
5 
 
into the interpretative assumptions that are required to underwrite a move from quantum 
mechanics to worldly indeterminacy, it is commonly claimed that that there is at least 
motivation from physics for seeking an account of metaphysical indeterminacy (see, for 
instance, Williams 2008; Wilson 2013; and Bokulich 2014). 
 
Although we think it can be doubted that quantum mechanics gives us motivation to seek a 
model of metaphysical indeterminacy, what we are interested in here is a different sort of 
problem. The problem is the following: many of those who present quantum mechanics as a 
motivation for accepting genuinely metaphysical indeterminacy provide models which 
aren’t able to capture precisely the quantum mechanical phenomena they point to as a 
motivation. Following Skow, we’ll focus on the Barnes-Williams model, but this issue 
plausibly arises for others too. The issue for BW is that the candidates for actuality in their 
model, the candidates between which reality is unsettled, are ersatz possible worlds. But 
worlds are maximal; being a possible world involves settling everything. In particular, every 
observable gets a value in a possible world. But the essence of the Kochen-Specker result is 
that it is impossible for every observable to have a value at once. It doesn’t even make sense 
within the mathematical constraints of the formalism to claim that every observable gets a 
value in the relevant contexts. Thus this kind of ‘deep’ indeterminacy cannot be modelled by 
the Barnes-Williams framework because the tools they use for the modelling are complete 
and precise.  
 
But what exactly is ‘deep’ metaphysical indeterminacy? Skow uses the term to refer to 
“metaphysical indeterminacy [which] runs so deep (or can run so deep) that reality cannot 
be completely precisified.” (Skow 2010 p.852, italics in original) The quantum mechanical 
case is therefore an alleged instance of this sort of metaphysical indeterminacy. Deep 
metaphysical indeterminacy is thus the sort of indeterminacy which resists complete 
precisifications, even into alternatives. It renders reality by nature incomplete.  
 
A related notion of deep indeterminacy is also worth mentioning. This takes deep 
metaphysical indeterminacy to be indeterminacy which is prescribed by the nature of the 
domain under discussion. It is part of the theoretical set-up that there is indeterminacy 
involved; indeterminacy is not an optional extra. In other words, any representation of the 
domain which is not indeterminate cannot be an accurate representation of how the 
domain could be: to fail to be indeterminate is to determinately fail to represent the 
relevant actuality.3 The quantum mechanical example is also an alleged case of this more 
general view of deep indeterminacy.  
 
The key point is that, in both senses, deep metaphysical indeterminacy cannot be modelled 
as unsettledness between complete, precise alternatives: these alternatives cannot be 
complete and precise if they are really to be alternatives for how things in fact are. So, 
independent of the precise quantum mechanical motivations for seeking a theory of 
                                                          
evolving in configuration space then yet again the fundamental ontology is perfectly determinate. Perhaps 
there is a sense in which derivative ontology that does include indeterminacy still falls under what is intended 
by ‘metaphysical indeterminacy’, but this is much less clear. See Glick (2017) for discussion: he is sceptical that 
there is a motivation to be found here. 
3 This notion can be applied more generally. As an example, we, along with Jon Robson as a co-author, discuss 
deep indeterminacy of this sort in the context of fictional indeterminacy (Darby, Pickup and Robson 2017). 
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metaphysical indeterminacy, we think it worth providing an account of metaphysical 
indeterminacy which allows for its deep variety. 
 
The response we'll pursue is to show how one can model deep indeterminacy by adjusting 
the BW framework in ways that we take to be independently plausible. Before we spell out 
the model, however, we should briefly note a dialectical point given our bracketing of 
various other potential responses to the issues arising from the Kochen-Specker result.  
 
We don’t wish to follow Skow in claiming that the Kochen-Specker result shows that deep 
indeterminacy is clearly possible, exactly, but just that it is at least important to explore how 
theories of metaphysical indeterminacy should handle it. There are coherent interpretative 
assumptions which would render quantum mechanics a case of deep indeterminacy. Even if 
the best interpretation of quantum mechanics does not turn out to warrant these 
assumptions, now that we’ve become aware of the possibility of deep indeterminacy it 
worth investigating how the Barnes-Williams model can be revised to account for it, given 
that it is at present incapable of doing so. Deep metaphysical indeterminacy sounds, on the 
surface at least, like it should be possible if the very idea of metaphysical indeterminacy is, 
and so should be accounted for by an acceptable theory.  
 
 
4. Modelling deep indeterminacy 
 
4.1 Situations and indeterminacy 
 
Our solution to the problem of deep indeterminacy will involve using different theoretical 
machinery. We will use situations to model metaphysical indeterminacy in a way that makes 
space for deep indeterminacy.4 As a first gloss, situations can be introduced as parts of 
possible worlds. This is only a gloss, though, as a thoroughgoing situation theorist will prefer 
to take situations as the theoretical primitive and then (if necessary) define possible worlds 
as special sorts of situation. How, exactly, to fully characterise situations isn’t a settled issue 
in situation theory.5 Nevertheless, whatever they are, situations are paradigmatically partial: 
they do not have to tell us everything.6 For instance, the situation encompassing only World 
War 2 does not give us any information about World War 1, or future Martian settlers, or 
events happening on a distant planet in 1945. To put it another way, situations will give 
answers to some, but not all, questions (whereas worlds give an answer to every question). 
Situation semantics proposes that we evaluate propositions with respect to situations rather 
than worlds. While possible world semantics offers possible worlds as the entities with 
                                                          
4 What follows uses the formal machinery of situation semantics. There are other semantics akin to situation 
semantics which might be conducive to a similar approach. In particular, Fine's Truthmaker Semantics (Fine 
2017) might be a fruitful alternative way to express the metaphysical claims here advanced (see also Yablo 
2014 for discussion of ‘aboutness’). What will be crucial is the partial nature of the entities under 
consideration and the denial of monotonicity that occurs below relating to persistence. 
5 Barwise (1988) lists a series of choice points for the nature of situations and their behaviour. 
6 One might define possible worlds as special sorts of situation that are maximal in some sense. Such situations 
would not be partial in that sense. There might also be an unrestrictedly maximal situation that described 
everything that is possible (akin to the Lewisian pluriverse): this would not be partial in any sense. Whether 
there are possible worlds or a maximal element are open questions in situation theory, but the point here is 
simply that situations do not need to be maximal in any sense. 
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respect to which propositions are evaluated, situation semanticists simply replace these 
maximal worlds with partial situations. 
 
There are several advantages to evaluating with respect to situations rather than worlds.7 
But we do not wish to be committed to situation semantics per se. Rather, we want to see 
what metaphysical work the tools of situation theory can do in the present context. Given 
this purpose, we will only introduce what machinery is necessary to do this work. 
Specifically, although there are a variety of ways to flesh out a situation theory and 
corresponding semantics, we will only fill in the picture where it is required for presenting 
our model. 
 
The proposition expressed by a typical statement like ‘Jane is swimming’ will be evaluated 
with respect to some particular situation: following Austin we take the statement to give 
both a claim and a specific situation with respect to which we can evaluate the claim.8 The 
proposition is true if Jane is swimming in the relevant situation. The proposition is false if 
Jane is, say, running in the relevant situation. But not all situations of evaluation will settle 
the question of whether Jane is swimming: situations that don’t contain Jane, for instance, 
will not say whether she is swimming. There is a situation-theoretic choice to make about 
the truth-value of the proposition in such situations. One alternative is to take the 
proposition to be false with respect to situations which don’t address the claim that is 
made. The other is to take the proposition to be neither true nor false. We favour the latter 
view, and this will be important for our model.  
 
Why believe that a proposition is neither true nor false when the situation of evaluation 
doesn’t settle the issue? Without going into too much detail, there are a few indicative 
reasons. One is that situations, being partial, just don’t tell us everything. If we take 
proposition to be false in situations which don’t settle the question of Jane’s swimming, we 
wouldn’t be able to distinguish by truth-value situations which show Jane is not swimming 
from those which are simply silent on the issue. Furthermore, if propositions are false in 
situations which don’t settle the relevant question then incompatible statements like ‘Jane 
is in motion’ and ‘Jane is at rest’ will receive the same truth-value (namely ‘false’) in 
situations which, for instance, just don’t contain Jane.9 
                                                          
7 Kratzer (2017) describes some areas within semantics where situations have been used productively, 
including anaphora and the Liar paradox. 
8 Broadly speaking, the claim is given by the ‘type’ of the statement, while the situation of evaluation is given 
by the particular ‘stating’ in context. In Austin (1950), which is a foundational text for this semantic approach, 
these are provided by two sets of conventions, the descriptive and the demonstrative respectively.  
9 There are ways to avoid this. One option is to restrict to atomic propositions: only atomic propositions which 
are not settled by a situation are false in that situation. If ‘at rest’ is defined as ‘not in motion’ and if ‘Jane is 
not in motion’ is equivalent to ‘it is not the case that Jane is in motion’, then ‘Jane is at rest’ will be the 
negation of ‘Jane is in motion’. The atomic ‘Jane is in motion’ will be false and so its negation, ‘Jane is at rest’, 
will be true. This is sort of move invokes negative free logic. 
There are reasons we are wary of this in the context of situation semantics. One is that it appears to 
rule out atomic propositions being incompatible. Though this is contentious, ‘The apple is red’ and ‘The apple 
is green’ appear to both be atomic and to be incompatible. Secondly, the equivalence of ‘Jane is not in motion’ 
and ‘it is not the case that Jane is in motion’ might be challenged in circumstances where Jane does not exist. 
At any rate, these considerations were only supposed to be indicative of motives for taking some 




This gives some motivation for the idea that propositions can lack truth values in situations. 
The example we have been using is a proposition about Jane’s activity being evaluated with 
respect to a situation in which she is not present. More generally, propositions about 
individuals will typically be neither true nor false in situations which lack them. (This won’t 
be the case for propositions asserting the existence of an individual, which will be false in 
situations lacking those individuals).10 This is not the only way to get a truth-value gap, 
however. Situations are fine-grained, so that a situation which contains an individual need 
not contain all the predicates true of that individual. For instance, a situation in which Jane 
is swimming might not include the fact that Jane is thinking about her dinner plans. The 
proposition ‘Jane is thinking about dinner’ can therefore still come out as neither true nor 
false when evaluated with respect to a situation containing Jane, if that situation is 
appropriately restricted. 
 
Propositions lacking truth-values in cases like this might be broadly described as those which 
are not about the situation (or, to put it the other way around, such situations 
underdetermine the propositions). This accords well with the spirit of situation theory: the 
fact that situations are partial is in sympathy with the view that situations don’t give a truth-
value for every proposition. However, we will require truth-value gaps in further cases as 
well. In particular, we’ll claim propositions can be neither true nor false when situations 
overdetermine propositions. This will become clearer when put into practice, but the 
motivating idea is that certain situations fail to settle certain propositions when they are 
conflicted about those propositions.11 We grant that cases like this might appear odd. 
Rather than defend them in the abstract, we hope that presenting the overall picture will be 
reassuring about the overall consistency of the model we present (even if it doesn’t yet fully 
convince). 
 
Our situation semantics, therefore, will allow propositions to lack truth-values, and in 
different ways. Two further, and uncontroversial, aspects of situation theory can be added. 
Firstly, that situations can be parts of one another (i.e. there are mereological relations 
between situations), and secondly that the evaluation of truth-values is situation-relative. 
                                                          
plausible account on which a proposition is false when the situation doesn’t speak to the proposition. (Thanks 
to a reviewer for prompting reflection on this.) 
10 Why will it be false? Because such propositions assert of an individual that it exists, when there is no such 
individual in the relevant situations of evaluation.  
 A typical semantics will make an existential quantification of the form ‘a exists’ true when and only 
when there is an admissible value of x which can be substituted in to the formula x = a to give a true identity. 
What is an admissible value will depend on context: for situation theory a natural domain for possible values 
of x is the individuals in the situation of evaluation. A situation in which a doesn’t exist will therefore not have 
an admissible value of x which can make x = a true. The statement ‘a exists’ will therefore be false in such 
situations. See the Appendix to Pickup (2016) for a sketch of an example semantics. 
Thanks to one reviewer for spotting that existential statements will be atypical in this way, and to 
both reviewers for prompting the more general discussion here.  
11 Deep indeterminacy, we’ll claim, can be modelled as an instance of this. Kit Fine’s Fragmentalism (2005) can 
also be interpreted in a cognate way, as generating conflicting fragments (=situations?) from the reality of 
tense. On one interpretation of Fine’s view, different times will give different truth-values for propositions, 
leading to truth-value gaps in the ‘über-reality’ which contains multiple times. Other applications of this 
overdetermination approach include puzzles about the persistence of material objects (see Pickup 2016 for an 
application to the Ship of Theseus case).  
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This provides a relation between situations and a situation-theoretic account of truth. 
Having given the basic components of situation theory, we can formulate our preferred 
model of metaphysical indeterminacy. 
 
 
4.2 The model 
 
As noted, the trouble with the BW model is that it requires complete precisifications (in the 
form of entire possible worlds) as the candidates between which the world is not settled. In 
short, as mentioned above, situations can be used as precisifications of incomplete things. 
According to us, therefore, determinacy is a matter of truth in situations which are 
candidates for actuality.  
 
To be explicit: we propose to replace the original BW structure with a new structure. BW 
evaluate propositions with respect to sets of ersatz possible worlds. These possible worlds 
are the candidate precisifications of reality. For BW, it is indeterminate whether p iff some 
of the ersatz worlds that are candidates for representing actuality are p-worlds, and some 
are ¬p worlds. It is determinate that p iff all these worlds are p-worlds. To be a candidate for 
representing actuality is to not determinately fail to represent actuality. Our structure 
evaluates propositions with respect to sets of (sharply defined but typically local and 
incomplete) situations. These situations are the candidate precisifications of parts of reality. 
A first pass at a situation-theoretic version of BW might be: 
 
Determinacy: A proposition p is determinate iff it is true in every situation which is a 
candidate for representing reality 
Indeterminacy: A proposition p is indeterminate iff it is true in some but not all 
situations which are candidates for representing reality 
 
But this isn’t quite right. For situations are partial, and will not contain all determinately true 
propositions. For instance, suppose it is determinate that a ball has a certain mass. The 
proposition expressing this will not be true in all situations which might represent reality, for 
many of these will simply not contain the ball. This is where our choice in the previous 
section to allow propositions to lack truth-values in situations starts to make a difference. 
For in situations which lack the ball, the proposition that it has a certain mass will be neither 
true nor false. Whereas a case of indeterminacy is a case where the different candidates will 
genuinely disagree about how reality is, i.e. the relevant proposition will be true in some 
situation and false in others. We can therefore offer the following definitions on our model: 
 
Determinacy: A proposition p is determinate iff it is true in some situation which is a 
candidate for representing reality and false in no such situation 
Indeterminacy: A proposition p is indeterminate iff it is true in some situation which 
is a candidate for representing reality and false in some other such situation 
 





To see how this works in practice, we will take a determinate case, a typical case of 
indeterminacy and a case of deep indeterminacy and show how the definitions apply. 
 
Let’s assume it is determinate that a particular ball has mass M. How does this fit the 
model? There will be a number of different situations which fail to determinately 
misrepresent reality: this is our set of situations with respect to which we evaluate. Some of 
these will contain the ball with its mass, and some will not. The situations lacking the 
(whole) ball and its mass will give no truth-value to the proposition expressing the claim that 
the ball has mass M: it will be neither true nor false in these situations. The situations 
containing the (whole) ball will be ones in which it has mass M, and so the relevant 
proposition will be true in them. This exhausts the situations in the evaluative set. Thus the 
proposition will be determinate: it is true in at least one situation which is a candidate for 
representing reality and false in no other such situation. 
 
Next, suppose it is (metaphysically) indeterminate whether Jones has some property F. 
Within the set of situations which don’t determinately misrepresent reality we will find 
many which say nothing about Jones’s F-ness. In these, the proposition expressing that 
Jones is F will be neither true nor false. As it is indeterminate whether Jones indeed is F, the 
remaining situations in the set will be of two types. In some, Jones will be F. In others, Jones 
will be not F. Thus, in some situations which are candidates the proposition will be true 
while in others it will be false, not merely neither true nor false. (This requires some 
semantic assumptions according to which ¬p being true entails p being false.) The 
proposition is therefore indeterminate, because it is true in some candidate situations and 
false in others. This works in much the same way as the supervaluationist approach to 
vagueness and, of course, in the way BW describe for worlds.  
 
Finally, suppose we have a case of deep indeterminacy.12 For ease, let’s use a quantum 
mechanical case (granting the required interpretative assumptions). Again, there will be 
many situations in the set of candidates for representing reality which say nothing about 
this quantum system, and hence in which propositions relating to it are neither true nor 
false. But there will also be other sorts of situation. Let’s consider four in particular, which 
contain certain information about the properties of the system. The first, s1, might, for 
instance, have a particle spin-up in the x-direction. Let this information be captured by a 
proposition p. Thus, in s1, p is true. The second situation, s2, is one in which the quantum 
system has contrary properties, e.g. the particle has opposite spin in the same direction. 
Thus, in s2, the proposition ¬p is true and so, given some semantic assumptions, p is false. So 
far, nothing differs from a normal case of indeterminacy, which can equally be captured by 
the BW model. But here's the distinctive advantage of situations: not all of the properties of 
the quantum system need to be precise in s1, which need for example include nothing about 
spin of that particle in the y-direction. Now take two further situations, s3 and s4. In s3, some 
proposition q, corresponding to some value for spin in the y-direction, is true, and ¬q is true 
in s4.13 Because of the Kochen-Specker theorem, there is a mathematical constraint that no 
situation contains determinate truth-values for both p and q. But this is not violated by s1-s4, 
                                                          
12 The example we use here is taken from our earlier joint work with Jon Robson: Darby, Pickup and Robson 
(2017). 
13 We are suppressing some details here, as in the quantum mechanical case there’d also be further situations 
corresponding to spin in the z-direction. Two pairs suffice for the demonstration, however. 
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as we can hold q to be neither true nor false in s1 and s2. And ¬q will likewise lack a truth-
value in s1 and s2. Similarly, both p and ¬p will fail to have a truth-value in s3 and s4. Thus in 
none of s1-s4 is there conflict with deep indeterminacy. We are not required to give truth-
values to any pair-wise combination of, one the one hand, p and ¬p and, on the other, q and 
¬q.  
 
Let's recap. We have four situations, and, in each, one of a pair of propositions is true (and 
the other false) while a second pair receives no truth-value. These situations are the 
candidate precisifications that give rise to the indeterminacy of the world with respect to 
the propositions. This, in essence, is our way to capture deep indeterminacy within a BW-
style framework. By using partial things, namely situations, in the model we can make space 
for deeply indeterminate propositions.  
 
So far, so good. But there is a sting in the tail. The situations which are candidates 
precisifications of actuality fundamentally disagree in cases of both garden-variety and deep 
indeterminacy. There is a threat that this fundamental disagreement will lead to a 
contradiction if we are not careful. In the Jones case, for instance, there are situations in 
which Jones is F and situations in which Jones is not. If there are larger candidate situations 
containing both of these, and if what is true in a part of a situation is true in the whole 
situation, then the larger candidate situation will be contradictory: in it Jones will be F and 
not F. We therefore need to spell out how the fundamental disagreement necessary for 
indeterminacy can be maintained without falling into contradiction.  
 
 
4.3 Disagreement without contradiction 
 
Not all truths which are in candidate situations can be consistently combined. We need to 
provide a restriction that rules out a situation which is a candidate for actuality from 
containing a contradiction while maintaining the fundamental disagreement in the model. 
There is a choice to be made about what the restriction is a restriction upon. Three 
possibilities present themselves.  
 
Firstly, the restriction could be a restriction on composition. According to this option, some 
situations compose a further situation only under some restricted circumstances. This solves 
the problem by finding an appropriate restriction such that there simply is no situation 
which contains as parts both a situation in which Jones is F and a situation in which Jones is 
not F. There would then be no threat of contradiction in any situation. Although situation 
theory usually operates with unrestricted and unique fusion as a mereological principle (at 
least for actual situations, on which more below), there’s no reason in principle why this 
couldn’t be rejected. 
 
Secondly, the restriction could be a restriction on what counts as a candidate for actuality. 
According to this option, only in restricted circumstances does fusing two situations which 
are candidates for actuality result in a situation which is also a candidate for actuality. This 
solves the problem because, given an appropriate restriction, although the situations in 
which Jones is F and in which Jones is not F are each candidates for actuality, the situation 
which combines them is not. There is a connection with the previous possibility here, as in 
12 
 
contexts without indeterminacy the only candidates for actuality will be the actual 
situations.  
 
Thirdly, the restriction could be a restriction on how truth transfers between situations 
related by parthood. In situation theory this is referred to as the question of the persistence 
of propositions across situations. Universal persistence states that whenever a proposition is 
true in a situation which is a part of another, it is also true in the larger situation. Situation 
semanticists are divided about whether or not universal persistence should be accepted.14 A 
restriction on persistence would solve the problem by finding an appropriate restriction 
such that propositions about Jones’s having or lacking F don’t persist into the fused 
situation.  
 
Broadly speaking, the choice of what to restrict upon is a choice between a mereological 
restriction (restricted composition), a modal restriction (restricted actuality) and a semantic 
restriction (restricted persistence). However, this choice will not make a difference to the 
formal task of providing a model for the account of metaphysical indeterminacy we 
propose. We will choose to take the semantic route and restrict which propositions persist 
from situations to their extensions for ease of exposition. We take our solution, however, to 
be translatable into the mereological or modal versions without issue. 
 
 
4.4 A restriction on persistence 
 
As mentioned above, it is a contentious issue in situation semantics whether propositions 
universally persist. We will propose that, in certain contexts, they do not. Although we think 
a precise restriction on persistence might be formalised, so that propositions persist unless 
certain conditions are satisfied, for our purposes here it is not necessary to elaborate and 
defend such a restriction.15 What matters for the argument is to explain how the failure of 
universal persistence allows for an adequate account of metaphysical indeterminacy.  
 
So, instead of providing a detailed account of restricted persistence we will operate with a 
guiding principle in line with the way we introduced truth-value gaps in sect. 4.1 above. 
There we noted that some propositions can be underdetermined and some overdetermined 
by situations. Our guiding principle will be that propositions fail to persist when they are 
overdetermined, i.e. when some other part of the larger situation into which they would 
persist already says something about the proposition. This overdetermination can be cashed 
out in terms of preclusion. A proposition is precluded by a situation when the proposition 
cannot be true with the contents of that situation.16 
                                                          
14 For instance, Kratzer (1989) keeps hold of universal persistence, but Elbourne (2005, 2013) rejects it. One 
initial reason to reject it comes from universally quantified statements (where they can be true in small 
situations but false in larger ones containing the former).  
15 See Pickup (2016) sect. 2.3 for an earlier discussion of a restriction on persistence. The restriction there 
employed goes via counting of existential situations for the particulars referred to by the proposition. (An 
existential situation for some a is a situation in which a exists.) This paper does not rely on that account of 
restricted persistence. 
16 Of course, a full theory of preclusion would be necessary to give a precise account of this restricted 
persistence condition. As we have said, we do not intent to furnish such a complete account: this would be a 




It might be helpful to give a brief example. Imagine that a banana changes from being green 
to being yellow. The banana will be green in some situations at the earlier time and yellow 
in some situations at the later time. Suppose there is a larger situation s which has both an 
earlier and a later situation as parts. If propositions universally persisted, the proposition 
that the banana is green and the proposition that it is yellow would both be true in s. But 
the idea we’re pursuing says that neither proposition persists, because the larger situation s 
overdetermines the colour of the banana. The proposition that the banana is green doesn’t 
persist from the smaller situation at the earlier time into s because s contains a part (viz. a 
situation concerning the later time) which says something about the proposition that the 
banana is green. Specifically, the later situation precludes the proposition that the banana is 
green. Parallel reasoning applies to the proposition that the banana is yellow. Hence neither 
of these propositions persists into s.17 This should give an indication of how the machinery is 
supposed to work, which we can then deploy to address the current problem. 
 
The problem we face is this: to explain how in a case of indeterminacy we get disagreement 
without contradiction. In short, the answer is that there are truth-value gaps of the 
overdetermination character when propositions fail to persist in indeterminacy cases. There 
is disagreement between situations but gaps, rather than contradictions, within situations.  
 
Consider the situations containing Jones being F and Jones being not F. The fusion of these 
situations is causing the problem, as if universal persistence were to be straightforwardly 
upheld, this situation would have both ‘Jones is F’ and ‘Jones is not F’ true in it. Our 
suggestion is simply that both of these propositions lack a truth-value in the fused situation. 
This is because there is overdetermination of propositions about Jones’s F-ness in the fused 
situation.18 
 
We used situations to explain how the deeply indeterminate quantum mechanical case 
might be dealt with: in s1 p is true, in s2 p is false, in s3 q is true and in s4 q is false without 
those situations specifying any other truth-values. We can now show how contradiction is 
avoided in larger situations containing some of s1-s4 as parts. In any situation containing 
both s1 and s2 as parts, p lacks a truth-value because p is overdetermined (and likewise with 
q in situations containing s3 and s4). The proposition p is precluded by s2 and ¬p is precluded 
by s1, so neither are true in the larger situation containing s1 and s2 as parts.  
                                                          
17 This is clearly just a toy example, and much more would need to be said about it. 
18 Suppose we fuse the minimal situation that Jones is F with the minimal situation that Jones is not F. Call this 
situation s*. From what we have said, it is clear that neither ‘Jones is F’ nor ‘Jones is not F’ will be true in s*. 
Will any proposition be true in s*? Yes: it is true in s* that it has a part in which Jones is F, and likewise true 
that it has a part in which Jones is not F. 
What about the disjunctive proposition ‘Jones is F or Jones is not F’? There is a choice-point here on 
the semantics: it could be true, false or neither true nor false. As it doesn’t affect our main argument, we 
won’t settle this question. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that, if such disjunctions are true in all cases 
like this, our model may be able to uphold excluded middle (though there’s further work to do to show this).  
Note, too, that the mereological relations between situations cannot be defined in terms of the 
mereological relations between the sets of propositions true in them. The set of propositions true in s* is not a 
fusion of the propositions true in the minimal situations in which Jones is F and not F precisely because 
persistence is not universal. This also has interesting consequences for the identity conditions of situations, 
which we cannot go into here. 




But, and here is the crux, it is also the case that any situation containing s1 and s3 will lack a 
truth-value for both p and q. Why is this? It is because s3 precludes p (p cannot be true with 
s3’s contents) and s1 precludes q. What is distinctive about this case is that s3 doesn’t 
preclude p by p being false in s3. Rather, s3 precludes p because, given the contents of s3, p 
cannot have either truth-value. This is unlike the typical cases of metaphysical 
indeterminacy above, and captures the deep indeterminacy. So, in general any situation 
containing one of the pair s1/s2 and one of s3/s4 will not receive a truth-value for either p or 
q. Thus the deeply indeterminate case is also captured: given the Kochen-Specker result, p 
and q cannot both receive truth-values in any situation and our interpretation is able to 
encode such constraints. In effect, what Kochen-Specker tells us is that p and q act as 
precluders for one another, making any situation containing parts in which both receive 
truth-values overdetermined in the relevant sense. Persistence therefore fails in these 
scenarios.  
 
To summarise: what it means for something to be metaphysically indeterminate is for a 
number of different, incompatible situations to be real candidates for the way the world is. 
A proposition is (metaphysically) indeterminate when it is true in some situation which is a 
candidate for actuality and false in another such situation. There is thus fundamental 
disagreement between the situations which are candidates for actuality. Situations allow 
unrestricted and unique fusion, so any situations can be combined. Furthermore, if two 
situations are candidates for actuality then their fusion is as well. This means there are 
situations which are candidates for actuality containing as parts situations which 
fundamentally disagree. If we accepted universal persistence, such situations would cause 
problems. But we do not: propositions persist only under restricted conditions. They fail to 
persist when overdetermined. This overdetermination can be expressed as preclusion: a 
proposition is overdetermined in a situation when that situation contains a part which 
precludes the proposition. A proposition is precluded by a situation when it cannot be true 
with the contents of that situation. Therefore, in situations which contain fundamentally 
disagreeing parts there are truth-value gaps concerning the propositions which are 
overdetermined by those fundamentally disagreeing parts. In typical cases of metaphysical 
indeterminacy, the propositions are precluded by virtue of being true in some part of the 
larger situation and false in some other part of that situation. By ruling out persistence, we 
avoid contradiction in these examples. Cases of deep indeterminacy are special cases of 
overdetermination where constraints are placed on which pairs of propositions can be true 
together. In these cases, the propositions are precluded by virtue of being true in some part 
of the larger situation and unable to have a truth-value in some other part of that situation. 
Each of the pair then lacks a truth-value in combined situations. So there are no situations in 
which either a contradiction is true or the constraints imposed by deep indeterminacy are 
violated.  
 
Thus we can safely hold that there is the fundamental disagreement required between 








In our discussion, we have so far focused on a particular quantum mechanical case where 
the Kochen-Specker theorem tells us that members of certain pairs of propositions cannot 
both receive definite truth-values.19 This is the issue of deep indeterminacy, and the 
example is one used in the literature to prosecute the BW model. In a recent paper, 
however, Calosi and Wilson have expanded the range of quantum mechanical cases that 
have been considered as instances of metaphysical indeterminacy. Specifically, the example 
we have discussed is a case of ‘incompatible observables’ in their terminology, and the 
further examples are those of superposition and entanglement (see Calosi and Wilson 2018, 
sect. 2.2). In this section, therefore, we wish to briefly show that the same mechanism we 
have used for the incompatible observables case can be applied to these other two 
examples where, arguably, quantum theory might warrant metaphysical indeterminacy. 
(We do so while still remaining agnostic on the value of quantum theory as a motivation for 





The classic example of superposition is Schrödinger’s unfortunate cat. The cat is put in a 
sealed box that has probabilistic mechanism (typically decay of a radioactive substance) 
which will release deadly gas if triggered. The system can be set up so that at some 
particular time the probability of the cat being alive and probability of the cat being dead 
are equal. The quantum mechanical upshot is that the cat is in a superposition of alive and 
dead. This superposition, given the interpretative assumptions we’ve been granting, is 
plausibly a related but distinct example of metaphysical indeterminacy: it seems 
metaphysically indeterminate whether the cat is alive or dead. 
 
Our model can deal with this case in a natural way. Consider the following three situations, 
each of which is a candidate for actuality: s1, a situation in which the cat is alive, s2, a 
situation in which the cat is dead, and s3, the fusion of s1 and s2. In s1, it is true that the cat is 
alive and false that it is dead. In s2 it is true that the cat is dead and false that it is alive. So, 
what status do these propositions have? According to our definition they are indeterminate, 
because there is a situation which is a candidate for actuality in which they are true and 
another situation which is a candidate for actuality in which they are false.  
 
What is the case in s3? It seems s3 is overdetermined with respect to the cat’s mortality, as 
parts of s3 disagree about whether the cat is alive. Specifically, s2 precludes the proposition 
that the cat is alive and s1 precludes the proposition that the cat is dead. So, following our 
argument above, the proposition that the cat is alive is neither true nor false in s3 (as is the 
proposition that the cat is dead).  
 
The indeterminacy involved in superposition is therefore dealt with. In fact, it operates in 
just the same way as a garden-variety case of metaphysical indeterminacy, like the example 
of Jones’s being F. 
 
                                                          






The phenomenon of quantum entanglement is more complicated on our picture. 
Entanglement is a feature exhibited by quantum systems when a composite system has 
definite values while the components of the system do not. For instance, consider two 
particles each in a superposition of two different properties (spin-up and spin-down in some 
direction, say). These particles can be prepared such that there is a perfect anti-correlation 
between their properties: if the first is measured and has one property, the other will 
always and immediately have the contrary property. If one is spin-up in the appropriate 
direction, the other is spin-down. This is so even though, because of the superposition, it is 
indeterminate which properties the particles have before measurement. More generally, 
the system composed of the two particles is definitely one in which both properties are had, 
but it isn’t determinate which particle has which property. The composite system is 
determinate in a way that the parts of the system are not. 
 
Entanglement is a phenomenon of significant philosophical interest. It challenges 
background assumptions used in forming physical theories, assumptions such as separability 
(the idea that the state of a whole is summed from the state of its parts) and locality (the 
denial of action at a distance). From our point of view, what is relevant is the way that 
entanglement, once again given interpretative assumptions, gives a pattern of determinacy 
and indeterminacy which is distinct from both cases we have considered so far. In an 
interesting way, entanglement seems to be the inverse of deep indeterminacy. Deep 
indeterminacy is a constraint which prevents certain things being determinate together. 
Entanglement is a phenomenon by which two things must become determinate together.  
 
To model this, we start as usual with some situations which are candidates for actuality. 
Take s1 and s2 to be the situations in which the first particle has spin-up and spin-down 
respectively in some direction. The particle is in a superposition of spin-up and spin-down, 
so as in the previous section the situation s3 which fuses s1 and s2 will be one into which the 
relevant propositions don’t persist. It is indeterminate whether the particle is spin-up or 
spin-down. The same is true of the second particle with corresponding situations s4 – s6. 
What is special about entanglement is that the fusion of the superposed states produces 
some determinacy. Let s7 be the fusion of s3 and s6. Although it is neither truth nor false in s3 
and s6 that the particle in the situation is spin-up or spin-down, it is true in s7 that one of the 
two particles is spin-up and the other is spin-down. Because this is true in s7, it is true in a 
candidate for actuality (as s7 is such a situation). It is false in no situation which is a 
candidate for actuality. Thus it is determinately true that one particle is spin-up and the 
other spin-down. However, for each particle it is indeterminate what spin it has.20 
                                                          
20 In fn 18 we mentioned that there is a decision to be made in the semantics about the truth-value of a 
disjunction in a situation where both disjuncts are indeterminate through overdetermination. This choice will 
have an interesting connection to the explanation of the entanglement case. Suppose such disjunctions are 
true; the disjunction ‘first particle spin-up or spin-down’ will be true in s3 (and s7). The disjunction ‘second 
particle spin-up or spin-down’ will be true in s6 (and s7). In s7, where both disjunctions are true, the following 
true disjunction also emerges: ‘(first particle spin-up and second particle spin-down) or (first particle spin-
down and second particle spin-up)’. What is ruled out is both particles having the same spin, i.e. the 




Our approach, therefore, allows us to capture the metaphysical indeterminacy (and 
determinacy) involved in entanglement by once more attending to what is the case in 
different situations which are all candidates for actuality. We have not, it must be admitted, 
explained why there is determinacy in s7 which is not present in any sub-situation. But we 
don’t take this to be the task, just as we haven’t explained why the pairs of propositions in a 
deeply indeterminate case preclude definite values for one another. We are simply 
providing a consistent model for metaphysical indeterminacy which can accurately capture 
all the relevant claims.  
 
(To be speculative for a moment: the holism seemingly involved in entanglement might 
make us reflect on which situations ought to be considered fundamental. It is tacitly 
assumed that smaller situations are more primitive, but there is nothing in the use of 
situations which requires this to be the case. A mereology of situations needn’t take parts to 
be prior to wholes. Working out this thought, however, would take us far beyond the scope 




This concludes our presentation of our model and interpretation. In what follows, we wish 
to evaluate the proposal. In particular, we will do so by looking at a non-exhaustive group of 
similar alternatives and showing a consequence our approach. In so doing, we also hope to 





We have offered a model which uses the basic insight of the Barnes-Williams account of 
metaphysical indeterminacy with some vital adjustments. These adjustments have some 
interesting effects. We’ll briefly highlight one of these. 
 
In our model, candidates for actuality can contain truth-value gaps. Thus the picture we 
present doesn’t uphold classical logic and, in particular, rejects bivalence (which was a 
supposed virtue claimed by the BW model).21 It’s a matter of debate whether we ought to 
uphold bivalence in contexts of metaphysical indeterminacy, but it is worth pointing out its 
denial already appears by our use of (typically partial) situations and our choice to take 
some propositions to be neither true nor false in some situations. Bivalence is not a feature 
well-suited to situation theory as we construe it.  
 
Nevertheless, the model we provide of metaphysical indeterminacy involves a more 
dramatic rejection of classical logic than that implied just by use of situations. We have 
truth-value gaps even in candidate situations which are intuitively ‘world-sized’. Further, we 
take it that a proposition can be neither true nor false in a situation even when that 
proposition is true or false in a part of that situation. This is precisely what happens in cases 
                                                          
spin-down)’. The phenomenon of entanglement can then be expressed as the truth of one disjunction and the 
falsity of the other in s7.  
21 It may also reject excluded middle, depending on the semantics. See fn 18. 
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of metaphysical indeterminacy. On our picture, situations can fail to return a truth-value for 
a proposition both by underdetermining it (e.g. by not containing the relevant individuals) 
but also by overdetermining it (e.g. by containing parts which disagree about how things 
are). This leads to situations where propositions are neither true nor false even though all 
the relevant entities are in those situations. Some may find this feature off-putting; here we 
can only make it explicit.22 
 
If this feature is considered to be off-putting, this might motivate a search for alternatives. 
We do not claim that ours is the only way in which one could adapt the Barnes-Williams 
model to handle deep indeterminacy. But it is also worth indicating some challenges for a 
few of the alternatives which immediately present themselves.23 
 
 
5.1 Persistence as worldly 
 
One initially attractive variant on our view can be fairly quickly dealt with. This view suggests 
a particular way to constrain persistence. It restricts persistence to cases where the relevant 
situations are both parts of the same world. To be explicit: on this view a proposition which 
is true in a situation is true in all extensions of that situation which are part of the same 
world.  
 
It is worth first seeing why this is supposed to help, before showing why it doesn’t. The 
garden-variety cases of metaphysical indeterminacy, like Jones’s being or not being F, 
threatened to lead to contradiction on our model if we allowed universal persistence, 
because there would be situations which are candidates for actuality which contained parts 
maintaining both that Jones is F and that Jones is not F. The condition that propositions only 
persist when the situations related by parthood are world-mates would deal with this issue. 
For the situations in which Jones is F and the situations in which Jones is not F are plausibly 
not jointly parts of any world (though they are jointly parts of some trans-world situations). 
So the condition would avoid the risk of contradiction in garden-variety cases of 
metaphysical indeterminacy.24 
 
Unfortunately, though, this proposal has no such success in cases of deep indeterminacy. 
Deep indeterminacy tells us that there are some scenarios where pairs of propositions 
                                                          
22 Pickup (2016) adds to a cumulative case for taking such a view seriously. 
23 We cannot consider all alternatives, but there are a few possible views we want to explicitly note we won’t 
be discussing. The first is to use our structure but retain universal persistence, ending up with truth-value gluts 
rather than truth-value gaps. The second is to use the BW model and allow physically impossible but 
metaphysically possible worlds to be candidate precisifications.  
Without going into detail, we find it hard with the first view to avoid falling into dialetheism and the 
second takes physically impossible worlds as candidates for actuality, which pushes against the idea that 
actuality implies physical possibility. 
The proposals of Torza (2017) is more promising, though it departs from BW in a more radical way 
than we do. Wilson (2013; 2016; Calosi and Wilson 2018) offers a quite different approach which again is more 
promising. But we don’t have space to survey all these alternatives here. 
24 This restriction might be best expressed as a restriction on candidacy for actuality: if two situations which 
are candidates for actuality are fused, it is always and only the case the fusion is a candidate for actuality if the 
component situations are jointly part of some world. As noted in the main text, deep indeterminacy shows this 
restriction too permissive. 
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cannot both be given truth-values even when they are not contradictory. In the quantum-
mechanical case we’ve discussed, p and q cannot both get truth-values in any situation 
which is a candidate for actuality. But it seems the situation s1 in which p is true and the 
situation s3 in which q is true can both be part of the same world (if not, we need to be told 
why). Therefore, according to the condition provided, situations containing both s1 and s3 as 
parts will have p and q both persist into them. This is precisely the problem with BW’s 
model that we started with: reality cannot be completely precisified into world-sized 
candidates for actuality.  
 
A condition on persistence which allows persistence whenever situations are world-mates 
collapses into the original BW model. It is worlds, not situations, which are doing the work 
on such a view. It is worth remembering that we are framing the issue in terms of the 
persistence of propositions, rather than in terms of composition or candidacy for actuality. 
But the point remains the same in these other terms. If we restrict composition so that 
situations only compose a further situation when they are world-mates25, or restrict 
candidacy for actuality so that situations are only candidates for actuality when all their 
parts are world-mates, we’ll still be left with the problem of deep indeterminacy. Therefore, 
for the solution to work, we need persistence (or composition, or candidacy for actuality) to 
fail even within worlds. 
 
 
5.2 Imprecise worlds 
 
In his paper criticising the BW model for its failure to capture deep indeterminacy, Brad 
Skow briefly considers a tweak to their model which bears some resemblance to our 
approach. He says: 
 
The orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is compatible with the existence 
of partial precisifications of reality. But the prospects of using this notion to put 
together a model of metaphysical indeterminacy similar to Barnes and Williams’ 
model are dim. For suppose we keep their framework but replace perfectly precise 
possible worlds with imprecise possible worlds (sets of sentences from a language 
which suffers from semantic indeterminacy). Even when there is no metaphysical 
indeterminacy, we can expect it to happen that several imprecise possible worlds do 
not determinately misrepresent reality. So using imprecise worlds would give 
multiple actuality even when there is no metaphysical indeterminacy. 
(Skow 2010, p.858) 
 
It isn’t completely clear to us how to unpack what Skow means here.26 But he seems to 
identify something like the model we have presented. It is, however, importantly distinct. 
We developed our model from what we called the ‘obvious’ idea that less-than-complete 
                                                          
25 A specific version of this view follows from one way to set up situation theory. Some situation theorists only 
allow actual situations to exist. If so, it is only actual situation that can be composed, which are trivially world-
mates in typical contexts. In this context, where we are considering multiple actualities, this situation-theoretic 
choice would be unwise.  
26 In particular, it isn’t clear exactly what sets of sentences from a language suffering from semantic 
indeterminacy has to do with the imprecision of possible worlds. 
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precisifications are substituted for BW’s complete, precise worlds. This idea admits of two 
readings: an ordinary possible world is maximal, in the sense of treating everything, and 
precise, in the sense that everything that it does treat, it treats precisely. A situation is less 
than maximal, treating some propositions but remaining silent about others; there is 
nothing inherently imprecise about this. Our view uses such precise (but incomplete) 
situations to model indeterminacy. Skow here appears to consider the other reading: his 
imprecise possible worlds are maximal (although he is not explicit about this) but imprecise.  
 
We are inclined to agree that imprecise worlds would not save the Barnes-Williams model, 
as it would over-generate indeterminacy. If we are using imprecise things in the modelling, 
even a precise reality would appear indeterminate. But, of course, that is not what we are 
doing. We use non-maximal but precise situations to model indeterminacy, and give 
circumstances when fusing precise situations leads to truth-value gaps. In cases where there 
is no metaphysical indeterminacy, there will be no gaps in the fusions. Our model therefore 
doesn’t over-generate indeterminacy. So, in effect our proposal is simply that Skow 
considers the wrong modification: don't use complete but imprecise worlds, use incomplete 
but precise situations.27  
 
 
5.3 Primitive indeterminacy of parthood 
 
A final alternative we’ll consider retains much of our model but makes an important change. 
It uses situations, as incomplete precisifications, but takes indeterminacy to be a matter of 
unsettledness about which situations are parts of the actual world. This offers a view with 
more surface resemblance to the original BW model, but there are reasons to be wary of it. 
In the first place, there are significant departures from BW once the theory is more closely 
examined, and secondly, we are worried that the phenomenon of deep indeterminacy is not 
adequately captured.  
 
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. First, the alternative. Return to the example above of 
our quantum system in situations s1-s4: p is true in s1, ¬p is true in s2, q is true in s3 and ¬q is 
true in s4. But s1-s4 don't give a truth-value for either of the propositions from the other pair. 
There are also situations which have more than one of s1-s4 as parts: these are the situations 
into which, on our model, the truth-values do not persist. On our model, p and q receive no 
truth-value in these situations. 
 
Recall that we have presented our view using the framing of a semantic restriction on when 
propositions persist. The alternative we now wish to consider is most easily expressed by 
instead considering a mereological restriction on which situations are able to compose a 
                                                          
27 Calosi and Wilson (2018) sect. 3.4.2 provides further argument against a partial precisifications view of the 
form that Skow envisages. One worry is about saving classical logic, and we concede our precise but 
incomplete situations don’t do this. The other worry is that the indeterminacy of imprecise worlds will need to 
be explained by some other means, which doesn’t arise for our view for the reason that we don’t have 
imprecise worlds, but precise situations. 
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further situation. This won’t matter to the formal structure of the alternative but makes 
exposition easier.28 
 
In these terms, this alternative states that there is some situation S which is the actual 
world. All of s1-s4 are candidates for actuality. But it is indeterminate which of each pair s1-s2 
and s3-s4 are parts of S. In other words, it is indeterminate which of s1-s4 compose S. There is 
thus primitive indeterminacy in the parthood relations of reality: in BW's terms we might 
say that it is unsettled which of each pair of situations is part of the actual world. (BW of 
course have unsettledness in a different form as primitive in their model, hence the 
abandonment of reductive ambitions.) The parthood relations are indeterminate but 
universal persistence need not be denied. All of s1-s4 remain candidates for actuality, but S 
contains only some of them (and it is indeterminate which). The situations which are parts 
of S are the ones whose propositions are true in S. Because its parts are indeterminate, it is 
indeterminate which propositions are true in S. 
 
Why not accept this alternative? We are concerned that the way that it deals with deep 
indeterminacy is inadequate. Let's make clear why. 
 
Though this view doesn't require that the propositions true in each of s1-s4 are all true in S, it 
does tell us that one from each pair of situations s1/s2 and s3/s4 is part of S.29 In other words, 
though it is unsettled whether s1 or s2 is part of S (and likewise for s3 and s4), because the 
parthood relations are indeterminate, it is determinate that either s1 or s2 is part of S. 
Likewise, it is determinate that either s3 or s4 is part of S. Universal persistence holds in this 
context, so what is true in a part of a situation is true in a whole situation. If it is 
determinate that either s1 or s2 is part of S, then it is determinate that either p or ¬p is true 
in S (though of course it is indeterminate which) and it is determinate that q or ¬q is true in 
S (though indeterminate which). The propositions persist, though which propositions is not 
determinate because which situations are parts of S is not determinate.30 Thus in S while it 
is indeterminate whether p and indeterminate whether q, it is determinate that one of each 
pair is true.  
 
This is already a violation of the spirit of Kochen-Specker and similar ‘no-go’ theorems in 
quantum mechanics: the point of such theorems is that certain pairs of propositions cannot 
be true together. S contains the sort of conjunctions of propositions that are supposed to be 
ruled out. But violating the spirit of a constraint is not a particularly effective criticism of a 
model, so we wish to spell out two reasons that we prefer our own account to the primitive 
indeterminacy of parthood model. 
 
                                                          
28 To be explicit: in terms of restricted persistence, the alternative spelled out below takes which propositions 
persist to be itself indeterminate. Some propositions do persist from s1-s4 to their extensions, it is just 
indeterminate which. Thus either p or ¬p and either q or ¬q persist, though it isn’t determinate which. Contrast 
this with our view, on which none of these persist. 
29 Recall that we are ignoring z-direction for simplicity: strictly speaking there would be a third pair of 
situations which gave determinate values for z-direction too.  
30 In the terminology of restricting persistence rather than composition the view says it is indeterminate which 
of the pairs s1/s2 and s3/s4 is such that what is true in them persists to a situation containing all of these as 
parts. But the truths from one of each pair certainly do persist. 
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In the first place, there are (contested) ways that a violation of the letter of Kochen-Specker 
can be derived. These are contested because they rely on assumptions which are 
themselves controversial in the context of indeterminacy and associated non-classical logics. 
But given that BW wish to preserve classical logic and the fact that surface resemblance to 
the BW might be a motivation for the view, it is instructive nevertheless to spell these out.31  
 
The view we’re considering suggests that, in S, it is indeterminate whether p, indeterminate 
whether ¬p, indeterminate whether q and indeterminate whether ¬q. It is, however, 
determinate that (p ∨ ¬p) and determinate that (q ∨ ¬q). If we add the very natural claim 
that determinacy is closed under conjunction, we can conclude that it’s determinate that ((p 
∨ ¬p) ∧ (q ∨ ¬q)).  
 
To get an explicit violation of Kochen-Specker, though, we need both p and q to get 
determinate truth-values in a situation. One way do so is to first add the assumption that 
conjunction distributes over disjunction, whereby we get the unwieldy claim: it is 
determinate that ((p ∧ q) ∨ (¬p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∧ ¬q)). If we further take it that a 
disjunction being determinate implies that it is determinate that a disjunct is true, we arrive 
at a violation. For we can conclude that either (p ∧ q) or (¬p ∧ q) or (p ∧ ¬q) or (¬p ∧ ¬q) is 
determinately the case. All of these are ruled out by Kochen-Specker. 
 
Of course, the assumptions used here can and will be challenged.32 But challenging them 
would require giving up classical logic, which BW do not wish to do. Now, we give up 
classical logic, so have no disagreement in principle with this move. It is simply worth noting 
that this alternative is not clearly closer to BW than our proposed model, and that there will 
be work to do to block a reappearance of the deep indeterminacy issue. 
 
The second worry we have with the model also concerns its approach to deep 
indeterminacy, but from a different direction. If S contains one of s1 or s2, but not both, and 
one of s3 and s4, but not both, then deep indeterminacy is captured using a different 
structure to garden-variety indeterminacy. This is because in garden-variety indeterminacy 
only one of a pair of conflicting situations is part of S (i.e. only s1 or s2 but not both). While in 
a deeply indeterminate case conflicting situations are both parts of S, because s1 (and s2) 
conflicts with both s3 and s4. In itself, this might be considered a virtue, as deep 
indeterminacy is a distinct phenomenon from garden-variety indeterminacy. But the issue is 
that the model thereby loses the ability to represent the distinctive relationship between 
the pairs of situations which cannot be jointly determinate.  
 
Consider another example, where two independent propositions are both indeterminate. 
Suppose it is indeterminate whether Jones is F and, separately and independently, 
indeterminate whether Smith is G. The model we are considering will treat this in precisely 
the same way as deep indeterminacy. There will be primitive indeterminacy in whether the 
world has as a part a situation in which Jones is F or a situation in which Jones is not F; 
likewise with a situation in which Smith is G and one in which she isn’t. This means that it 
will be determinate that ((Jones is F ∨ ¬Jones is F) ∧ (Smith is G ∨ ¬Smith is G)). But, as 
                                                          
31 Thanks to a referee for pushing us to consider these assumptions. 




described in the previous paragraphs, avoiding a violation of Kochen-Specker will require 
rejecting assumptions that warrant the move from this to (Jones is F ∧ Smith is G) or (¬Jones 
is F ∧ Smith is G) or … . Thus a case of deep indeterminacy and a case of independent 
indeterminacy are represented the same way, which undermines the expressive power of 
the account we’re currently considering. 
 
In our view, and this is somewhat speculative, it is the fact that the model permits the 
determinate conjunction of ((p ∨ ¬p) ∧ (q ∨ ¬q)) which is the root of the problem. As much 
as revising classical logic might prevent this from leading to a direct violation of Kochen-
Specker, a natural way to capture Kochen-Specker within a model of indeterminacy is to rule 
out precisely such conjunctions in the appropriate cases. So we do not think that, ultimately, 
this model can adequately capture deep indeterminacy.33 
 
To conclude this section, we can express some of these misgivings in the terminology of 
BW’s One True world. According to the current model there is One True actual world, but it 
is unsettled which situations it has as parts. The parts of the One True world, however, are 
fully determinate, and universal persistence obtains. So, whichever parts these may be (and 
this is indeterminate), the propositions true in them are true in the One True world. It is as 
though reality is poised between alternative situations as its parts, but in each of these 
alternatives we have members from both pairs of propositions.  
 
But the point of deep indeterminacy is that it tells us that the sort of things reality is poised 
between are not possible: there can't be One True world with a truth value for p and a truth 
value for q. Being poised between impossible alternatives, plausibly, is itself impossible. If 
no alternative is possible, then the One True world isn’t possible either. 
 
This leads towards a surprising result. It is not the fact that the BW model uses complete 
precisifications that is the issue; incomplete precisifications (situations) can likewise lead to 
a violation of Kochen-Specker type considerations if we accept that there is One True world, 
even if it is not determinate which it is. For this world, if it is precise, will not be able to 
accurately represent reality. Instead, we need to do away with the One True world: it is not 
that it is indeterminate which is the One True world, but that the One True world itself is not 
determinate. The One True world has incompatible parts. 
 
 
5.4 Evaluation summary 
 
In this section, we have brought out a consequence of the model we have presented and 
compared it with some alternatives. The consequence is that, if there is metaphysical 
indeterminacy, candidates for actuality have irreducible truth-value gaps. Thus the 
contenders for reality are not bivalent. This might seem undesirable but might be, we think, 
a consequence of taking metaphysical indeterminacy seriously. 
 
                                                          
33 It could be suggested that only one of s1-s4 is a part of S (and it is indeterminate which) (thanks to Gonzalo 
Rodriguez-Pereyra for this suggestion). But this seems difficult to square with claims about fixed relative values 
of variables in quantum mechanical cases (see Torza 2017). It also seems to give up the desiderata that there is 
One True (complete) actual world: such a world would be incomplete.   
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The alternatives to our model we have considered seem to either (i) suffer from the same 
issues with deep indeterminacy that undermine the BW approach we started with (and in 
one case collapse into it) or (ii) stipulate indeterminacy when there is none (as argued by 
Skow). This has hopefully made clearer exactly how our own model should be understood 





We have constructed a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can handle deep 
indeterminacy. After outlining Barnes and Williams's recent meta-level model of 
metaphysical indeterminacy, we rehearsed arguments that it is incompatible with the kind 
of ‘deep’ indeterminacy that is arguably involved in quantum mechanics, and in any case 
ought to be handled by a model of metaphysical indeterminacy. This might raise doubts that 
a meta-level account can make space for such indeterminacy. We believe it can, and so set 
out to give a reformulation of the Barnes-Williams model using incomplete, local situations. 
We explained the basic ideas behind situation semantics and showed how a domain of 
incomplete situations, together with a mereology defined on them, can give rise to a variant 
of the Barnes-Williams model that is close to the original but accommodates deep 
indeterminacy. The core idea is that the candidate precisifications are precise but non-
maximal: these precisifications are parts of the world. Indeterminacy is then a matter of 
something being true in some candidate situations and false in others. This leads to 
incompatibility but not, we argue, contradiction. The manoeuvres required to retain 
incompatibility without contradiction give an interesting account. Finally, we evaluated our 
model to show how it is to be understood and how it is preferable to similar alternatives.  
 
Our conclusion is that there is at least one viable meta-level account of metaphysical 
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